For the foreseeable future, our Zoom calls will be held at a new time: Friday at 11 AM Eastern.
Our guest this week will be Jamil Dakwar, a human rights lawyer, adjunct professor at New York University, and former senior attorney with Adalah, which advocates for the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel. He’ll be speaking in his personal capacity. We’ll talk about the case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and the case against Israeli and Hamas leaders at the International Criminal Court.
Paid subscribers will get the link this Tuesday and the video the following week. They’ll also gain access to our library of past Zoom interviews with guests like Rashid Khalidi, Thomas Friedman, Ilhan Omar, Benny Morris, Noam Chomsky, and Bret Stephens.
Sources Cited in this Video
Things to Read
(Maybe this should be obvious, but I link to articles and videos I find provocative and significant, not necessarily ones I entirely agree with.)
In Jewish Currents (subscribe!), Raphael Magarik talks with Maya Wind about her book, Towers of Ivory and Steel: How Israeli Universities Deny Palestinian Freedom.
Like so many people with family in Gaza, the political analyst Khalil Sayegh has endured unthinkable agony since this war began. He’s seen his father and sister killed. He’s trying to bring his remaining family members to safety. If you can help, please do. Please also consider helping the Alshawa family, which is sheltering in central Gaza and hoping to evacuate to safety.
For the Foundation for Middle East Peace’s Occupied Thoughts podcast, I talked to Sapir Sluzker Amran about being a queer, feminist, Mizrachi activist in Israel—and about her decision to go to the border with Gaza to challenge people preventing the delivery of aid.
Muhammad Shehada on the danger of selective empathy.
Michael Sfard on the failure of the Israeli media.
Mehdi Hasan vs Jonathan Schanzer on the ICC’s warrants against Israeli leaders.
Former Israeli combat soldier Ariel Bernstein on how Israel is fighting in Gaza.
Imagine if US leaders talked like Irish leaders about Gaza.
M.J. Rosenberg has renamed his Substack (and subscribers must resubscribe).
See you on Friday at 11 AM,
Peter
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT:
Hi. So, I’ve been thinking about why the Biden administration has made the decisions that it’s made on this war. Decisions that seem to me to have been disastrous and catastrophic, not just for the people in Gaza though that’s obviously the most important thing—all the people who’ve died and been injured and who’ve been forced from their homes—but also has been politically disastrous, and I think actually potentially disastrous also for the careers of top Biden administration officials themselves. Politically disastrous because Joe Biden now is in a situation, as we enter into the kind of the meat of the presidential campaign, in which he literally can’t go speak to his own party’s base. He can’t go speak at a university. He can’t go speak at a Black church. He can’t even go speak at a union event without the very real prospect of his speech being protested, even interrupted, because there’s so much anger at his policy on Gaza.
It’s one thing not to have a hugely enthusiastic voter base, as Biden, you know, never really had a hugely enthusiastic support from his party’s base. But to have people be so angry at you in your own party’s base that you can’t go to the institutions of your own party’s base without literally having people protest you, that’s a huge warning sign for a presidential campaign. Yes, it would have been very challenging for Biden to take a different line on the Gaza War as well. But it doesn’t seem to me that they recognized early on how bad, politically, how dangerous this path they were on was.
And secondly, I don’t get the sense that people in the Biden administration, the foreign policy team, understand the potential ramifications for their careers over this. I mean, there has been a pattern that, if you leave an administration, you can go to work on Wall Street, you can be a consultant. But often times, people also go to universities. They become deans of colleges, universities. They teach at universities. This is a kind of an enjoyable thing for folks to do in the few years while they wait for their party to regain power. This is what people did after the Clinton administration, after the Obama administration.
I think we’re in a very different world now. I think if you are a top Biden foreign policy official, and think that you can go for a couple of pleasant years to some leafy university campus, and teach a couple classes, and hang out for a while, I think you’re sorely mistaken. I think the experience of a Biden official who was involved in this war going to a university in the coming years would be not that different than the experience of people like McGeorge Bundy and and Walt Rostow experienced when they tried to go back to the universities that they had been in before the Vietnam War. These people are gonna be treated with a lot of anger for what they’ve done.
And so, I think about why was it that the administration took this path. And this is my theory. My theory is that if you work in Washington foreign policy for a long period of time, you become more and more divorced from how ordinary progressive minded people think about the world, especially on Israel-Palestine. And the reason you become divorced from them is that when people in Washington talk and work in Washington foreign policy, they always have to think in terms of constraints of what’s politically possible.
I used to work at Washington think tanks. I used to spend a lot of time with people who came in and out of Democratic foreign policy jobs. And one of the things that always struck me was that, even in relatively private settings, when people would talk about policy, they would always adopt the framework of what is politically possible; what was politically salable, could be sold in their view, politically. And they just were not generally interested in thinking outside of those terms. Because if you talk in terms of policy ideas or moral perspectives that are outside of the bounds of what’s considered politically possible, you kind of make yourself irrelevant. I think that’s the kind of the idea in Washington. You become someone who’s not really useful, who’s actually a kind of pain in the neck to have around, right? Because the last thing that a policymaker or politician wants is to be told to do something that basically, politically, they don’t feel like they can do. So, people adopt these really narrowing constraints in terms of how they talk about policy in general, but especially on Israel-Palestine, because that’s the foreign policy issue on which the political pressures are the greatest.
And so, what I noticed was that even to make moral arguments about what Israel was doing to the Palestinians, and to suggest that there should be consequences for those moral decisions, was often essentially to speak outside of the political constraints that people were interested in talking about. That essentially people almost like shut off that entire conversation, almost like shut off that entire part of their brain. I think these were people who, had they gone in a different course in life, would have understood that what America was helping Israel do towards Palestinians was deeply immoral. But they recognize that if they were to adopt that perspective, let alone vocalize it within Washington, it would be very injurious to their careers.
I mean, imagine you are a junior or mid-level foreign policy official in a Democratic administration, and you go on record, or you’re heard to say that, you know, five years ago that you think America should condition military aid, or there should be international legal consequences for what Israel is doing. That would be a good way of basically ending your career in government. And so, I think what happens is that people, essentially over time, they shut that part of their brain off—the part of their brain that might have a kind of a moral revulsion at what Israel is doing to Palestinians, and what America is helping Israel do to Palestinians.
And if you do that long enough, I think you can come to forget the ordinary people out there in the country, ordinary progressive minded people, who are seeing these horrifying images day after day of what’s happening to people in Gaza, that they don’t do that. They don’t kind of sublimate these instincts. They just respond in a much more kind of natural, intuitive way, like, why are we doing this? This is completely contrary to my values. Why are my taxpayer dollars being used to fund this? I think what’s happened in Washington is that Democrats, over time—Democrats in the foreign policy kind of establishment—basically turn off that part of their brain in order to succeed and make their way up the ranks in foreign policy in Washington.
And if you do that long enough, I think it makes it harder for you to predict that that’s how ordinary progressive Americans would respond to the war in Gaza. So, I think that may be why people in the Biden administration were slow to recognize that this issue of Gaza was becoming really, really important to progressives in America—that progressive people in America would be revolted by what they were seeing. Because I think the people in the Biden administration themselves had, over time, undergone a process in which they didn’t allow themselves to have those same human responses because they were within a political environment in which it would have been very counterproductive for them to do that. And that helps to explain this disconnect between the Biden administration and the progressive base of the Democratic Party that I think now represents a threat to Biden’s re-election campaign. And I also think it is something that will dog people in the Biden administration for years to come.
