Last Thursday, Poland’s foreign minister warned that the crisis over Ukraine means the “risk of war” in Europe “is now greater than ever before in the last 30 years.” Most people in official Washington blame Vladimir Putin for that. I blame him too. But I also blame an American foreign policy class so wedded to fantasies of American innocence that it can’t imagine why Putin, or anyone else, would see America as a threat. And I suspect we’d be a lot further from war if Joe Biden’s top foreign policy aides were Mexican Americans.
I lived in 2 countries affected by American foreign policy. I couldn"t agree more with you. I shudder when American liberals talk about America as the democratic beacon for the world. The support of Hassan II who was a monster and the campaign against Ben Barka (socialist leader) in Morocco where I lived between 1960 and 1966. This had a profound and negative effect
The campaign to dislodge de Gaulle after the 2nd World War because of the Communist role in his government. Great powers are never innocent. We have to monitor them carefully.
As for the Jewish community in Morocco my impression was of integration particularly in the rural areas. Differences were encouraged by the French and accentuated by the Naqba and by the active recruitment of Israeli agents encouraging departure to Israel
I would just take issue with the last sentence of this piece which suggests that Russia is just demanding a "sphere of influence". This might be how some people characterize it for rhetorical advantage, but it is too crude and simplistic. As I understand it, Russia is not demanding a "sphere of influence" (and neither should the US). Rather, Russia is invoking the nascent concept of "indivisible security" as found in OSCE declarations and elsewhere, wherein e.g. "The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others..." and "They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States." (Astana Commemorative Declaration 2010) In other words, international security should not be a zero-sum game. This applies especially to bordering states. It does not require "spheres of influence" but rather just some kind of international neighborliness whereby all states give some consideration to the implications (and perceived implications) of their policies on other states, especially their neighbors.
this is a messy straw-man - you really think that launching a strike against an unhinged leader and his gaggle of commies executing muslims in Europe in the 90s undermines the notion that NATO is set up to be defensive and not offensive? THATS your evidence ... that NATO is a threat?? I love when the anti-imperialist left in the US (which by the way, no one under 35 supports lol) goes full-on genocide acceptance so long as it serves their myth that the US was once isolated to a minor sphere of influence (apparently Europe, Africa, and South America was secretly America this entire time). Wake up, America has never been isolationist; it has always had - and continues to have, and increasingly so actually especially among younger generations and among new immigrants/Americans - imperial ambitions - or at the very least an acknowledgment that America was never innocent and no one is even delusional about that; we're a military and economic superpower. Get over it. Russians will not be pleased unless everyone in their sphere of influence is back to killing each other. Call me the day we force Canada and Mexico to have a dogfight in our backyard.
I concur with this analysis as far as it goes, but would suggest that it omits an important dimension. This is that there is still some affinity and mutual regard between Russia and Russian ethnic and language groups which make up significant parts of the population in some regions of former Soviet republics (such as the Donbas in Ukraine). To some extent, Russians might also feel themselves part of a broader Slavic fellowship, although this is probably not reciprocated in most cases. This might help to explain why Russia has supported the "frozen conflicts" in some of its bordering states, and opposed NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, while it looks with somewhat greater equanimity on its "loss" of the (non-Russian speaking, non-Slavic) Baltic states for example. I would also have thought that the Minsk agreements might have merited some mention in this analysis.
I understand that the German government is undertaking a new initiative to mediate this situation. It would indeed be good for there to be an adult in the room.
I lived in 2 countries affected by American foreign policy. I couldn"t agree more with you. I shudder when American liberals talk about America as the democratic beacon for the world. The support of Hassan II who was a monster and the campaign against Ben Barka (socialist leader) in Morocco where I lived between 1960 and 1966. This had a profound and negative effect
The campaign to dislodge de Gaulle after the 2nd World War because of the Communist role in his government. Great powers are never innocent. We have to monitor them carefully.
As for the Jewish community in Morocco my impression was of integration particularly in the rural areas. Differences were encouraged by the French and accentuated by the Naqba and by the active recruitment of Israeli agents encouraging departure to Israel
I would just take issue with the last sentence of this piece which suggests that Russia is just demanding a "sphere of influence". This might be how some people characterize it for rhetorical advantage, but it is too crude and simplistic. As I understand it, Russia is not demanding a "sphere of influence" (and neither should the US). Rather, Russia is invoking the nascent concept of "indivisible security" as found in OSCE declarations and elsewhere, wherein e.g. "The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others..." and "They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States." (Astana Commemorative Declaration 2010) In other words, international security should not be a zero-sum game. This applies especially to bordering states. It does not require "spheres of influence" but rather just some kind of international neighborliness whereby all states give some consideration to the implications (and perceived implications) of their policies on other states, especially their neighbors.
this is a messy straw-man - you really think that launching a strike against an unhinged leader and his gaggle of commies executing muslims in Europe in the 90s undermines the notion that NATO is set up to be defensive and not offensive? THATS your evidence ... that NATO is a threat?? I love when the anti-imperialist left in the US (which by the way, no one under 35 supports lol) goes full-on genocide acceptance so long as it serves their myth that the US was once isolated to a minor sphere of influence (apparently Europe, Africa, and South America was secretly America this entire time). Wake up, America has never been isolationist; it has always had - and continues to have, and increasingly so actually especially among younger generations and among new immigrants/Americans - imperial ambitions - or at the very least an acknowledgment that America was never innocent and no one is even delusional about that; we're a military and economic superpower. Get over it. Russians will not be pleased unless everyone in their sphere of influence is back to killing each other. Call me the day we force Canada and Mexico to have a dogfight in our backyard.
I concur with this analysis as far as it goes, but would suggest that it omits an important dimension. This is that there is still some affinity and mutual regard between Russia and Russian ethnic and language groups which make up significant parts of the population in some regions of former Soviet republics (such as the Donbas in Ukraine). To some extent, Russians might also feel themselves part of a broader Slavic fellowship, although this is probably not reciprocated in most cases. This might help to explain why Russia has supported the "frozen conflicts" in some of its bordering states, and opposed NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, while it looks with somewhat greater equanimity on its "loss" of the (non-Russian speaking, non-Slavic) Baltic states for example. I would also have thought that the Minsk agreements might have merited some mention in this analysis.
I understand that the German government is undertaking a new initiative to mediate this situation. It would indeed be good for there to be an adult in the room.