Much of this analysis is honestly superfluous, and easily vulnerable to claims of appeasement, particularly since Ukraine was in the NATO accession process. It also largely ignores the strategic logic of international alliances and would make them more vulnerable to problems of shirking/free-riding.
Much of this analysis is honestly superfluous, and easily vulnerable to claims of appeasement, particularly since Ukraine was in the NATO accession process. It also largely ignores the strategic logic of international alliances and would make them more vulnerable to problems of shirking/free-riding.
That said, there is some value to it, mostly because of one claim that you buried in a paragraph towards the end, and really should be the focus of the column: "Making the weakening of Russia a goal of US policy is unnecessary because Russia has now clearly shown that it poses no serious conventional military threat to NATO countries. If the Kremlin can’t take Kharkiv, how can it take Warsaw?"
I'd love to see this logic expanded in more depth, and an argument why that's the central point of importance.
Much of this analysis is honestly superfluous, and easily vulnerable to claims of appeasement, particularly since Ukraine was in the NATO accession process. It also largely ignores the strategic logic of international alliances and would make them more vulnerable to problems of shirking/free-riding.
That said, there is some value to it, mostly because of one claim that you buried in a paragraph towards the end, and really should be the focus of the column: "Making the weakening of Russia a goal of US policy is unnecessary because Russia has now clearly shown that it poses no serious conventional military threat to NATO countries. If the Kremlin can’t take Kharkiv, how can it take Warsaw?"
I'd love to see this logic expanded in more depth, and an argument why that's the central point of importance.